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INTRODUCTION

In April of 2011, the author published a piece entitled “The
Twombly Standard and Affirmative Defenses: What is Good for
the Goose is Not Always Good for the Gander”1 in an attempt to
assist courts grappling with the interpretation and application
of the new and reasonably untested Twombly and Iqbal
decisions. At the time, there were few cases that had broached
the novel issue of whether the plausibility pleading standard for
claims, which was articulated in Twombly and then clarified and
extended in Iqbal, applied to a defendant’s pleading of
affirmative defenses.
That was the first piece written on the subject at length.2 It
argued that both the text and the intention of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the specific holdings and public policy
considerations that the Supreme Court of the United States
articulated in the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, and simple
fairness all supported the notion that the plausibility pleading
standard should not extend to affirmative defenses.
Now that approximately ten years have passed, it seems like
an appropriate time to revisit these issues. Jurisprudence
relating to the plausibility pleading standard is much better
developed, and many more courts have now had the opportunity
to consider whether that standard extends to affirmative
defenses. However, despite this growing maturity in the law, no
perfect consensus has yet emerged on this question.
The trend among the courts over the last decade has moved
strongly away from extending the plausibility pleading standard
to affirmative defenses. In 2019, however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided GEOMC Co. v.
Calmare Therapeutics Inc.,3 and became the first circuit court to
consider the question directly. The Second Circuit ruled that the
1. Anthony Gambol, Note, The Twombly Standard and Affirmative
Defenses: What Is Good for the Goose Is Not Always Good for the Gander, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 2173 (2011).
2. A piece published by The Florida Bar identified the issue in 2010 but
did not offer much by way of analysis or direction. See Manuel John
Dominguez et al., The Plausibility Standard as a Double-Edged Sword: The
Application of Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 84 FLA. B.J. 77
(2010). Others followed on both sides of the issue.
3. See GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92 (2d Cir.
2019).
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plausibility pleading standard shall apply to affirmative
defenses, with some qualifications.
The purpose of this Article is to examine and synthesize the
developments in this area of law over the last decade. After
some brief background, it will review the arguments that have
held sway in the courts both for and against extending the
plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses. It will
comment on the trend in the jurisprudence. It will then offer a
thorough review and analysis of the Second Circuit’s GEOMC
decision, as well as offer decisions from other circuits that
suggest their thinking. Based upon this review, this Article
concludes that procedure, precedent, and policy still heavily
support not extending the plausibility pleading standard to
affirmative defenses.
II.

BACKGROUND

This Section introduces the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and their relevance to standards of pleading. It will describe the
historical notice pleading standard for claims and how it
changed into the modern plausibility pleading standard.
Finally, it will describe the traditional manner of pleading
affirmative defenses.
A. The Federal Rules and Notice Pleading
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern procedure in
all civil actions in the United States district courts.4 The Rules
are promulgated by the Supreme Court under a grant of
authorization from Congress.5 The Rules are specifically
procedural in nature and may not “abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right.”6 The analysis of the proper application
and effect of the Rules has resulted in the countless gallons of
spilled ink by courts, commentators, and litigants.
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
5. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074.
The Rules are
periodically updated by the Supreme Court via an elaborate committee review
procedure, pursuant to a statutory requirement that the Judicial Conference
of the United States, the national policy-making body for the federal courts,
must “carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general
rules of practice and procedure . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 331.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).

3
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Rule 8 describes and defines the standards of pleading in
the federal courts.7 Failure to satisfy Rule 8 makes a claim
susceptible to dismissal.8 For claims for relief, Rule 8(a) requires
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”9 For most of the Rules’ history, the
interpretation of this brief but vital statement was governed
primarily by the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson.10
In Conley, the Court solidified what had previously been a
generalized rule: claims should be allowed to stand unless the
plaintiff can proffer “no set of facts” under which the claim will
succeed.11 The Court based this conclusion on Rule 8, which does
not require a plaintiff to articulate all of the facts upon which a
claim is based.12 Rather, the Court interpreted the “short and
plain statement” language of Rule 8 to require a plaintiff to offer
only such allegations as are sufficient to give a defendant “fair
notice of . . . the plaintiff’s claim . . . and the grounds upon which
it rests.”13 This “notice pleading” standard would go on to govern
federal pleadings for fifty years.
B. The Plausibility Pleading Standard
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,14 the Supreme Court
abrogated the precedent set by Conley.15 The Court instructed
that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (“Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading”).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Mobley v. McCormick,
40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994) (“The nature of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests
the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint . . .
.”).
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
10. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Conley was a class suit in which
the plaintiffs were African American railway workers alleging discriminatory
disparate treatment by their union. The union argued that the plaintiffs had
not stated a claim for which relief could be granted and had failed to articulate
specific facts in their complaint to support their claims.
11. Id. at 45–46.
12. Id. at 47.
13. Id.
14. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
15. E.g., E.R. v. Stitt, No. CIV-18-1137-SLP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
159393, at *6 n.5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2019).
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will not do.”16 Rather, Rule 8 requires a claim to have an
affirmative “showing” sufficient to give fair notice of the
“grounds on which the claim rests.”17 The Court articulated that
failure to plead sufficient factual material to nudge a claim from
the realm of mere possibility into “plausibility” should result in
that claim being excised at the earliest stage for the sake of
efficiency and economy.18 Notably, the Court explained that
some part of its analysis was intended to avoid the burden on
defendants of abusive discovery practices and nuisance
settlements, which, in the antitrust arena like Twombly, could
be monumental.19 Accordingly, the Court justified requiring
something more than simple notice of what a claim entailed: a
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.”20
Initially, the scale of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Twombly was a bit circumscribed by its sounding in antitrust
law.21 The dissent in Twombly, however, accurately presaged
that “whether [the Court’s] test for the sufficiency of a complaint
will inure to the benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that
the future will answer.”22
Indeed, just two years later, the Supreme Court expressly
held in Ashcroft v. Iqbal23 that the Court in Twombly had
expounded the pleading standard for “all civil actions.”24 The

16. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Twombly matter comprised a putative
class action with allegations of conspiracy in restraint of trade against
telephone and internet service carriers under the Sherman Act. The Court
found that even if the allegations in the complaint were consistent with
conspiracy, “conscious parallelism” was equally likely and was not unlawful.
Accordingly, the plaintiff had failed to make sufficient showing for the claim to
survive; the allegations did not display that the unlawful interpretation of
events was more “plausible” than an innocent, business-motivated one. The
Court found that there was “an obvious alternative explanation” that plaintiffs
failed to vitiate.
17. Id. at 555 n.3 (referencing both Rule 8 and Conley).
18. Id. at 558.
19. See id. at 559. The dissent also acknowledged this as a rationale of
the decision. Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 570, 569 n.14 (majority opinion).
21. E.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
22. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662.
24. Id. at 684. Iqbal related to the claims of a Pakistani immigrant
against Attorney General John Ashcroft, inter alia, after he was detained on

5
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Iqbal Court first reiterated the Twombly decision, that the
standard of plausibility was not a probability requirement, but
rather a requirement for sufficient factual support to suggest
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted
unlawfully.”25 The Court offered relatively specific instructions
for lower courts to consider the sufficiency of pled claims under
its new standard: first, a court must accept as true all of the
factual allegations of a complaint, but none of the legal
conclusions.26 Thereupon, only a claim that contains a plausible
claim for relief can survive a motion to dismiss—a contextspecific analysis guided by “experience and common sense.”27
The Iqbal Court expressly disclaimed that the standard
articulated in Twombly was limited to the antitrust context.
Rather, it insisted that Twombly was decided based upon an
analysis of the Federal Rules and, accordingly, that it applied in
all contexts in which the Federal Rules apply.28
C. Pleading Affirmative Defenses
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) governs the pleading of
affirmative defenses by defendants.29 An affirmative defense is
a statement in a responsive pleading that precludes liability
even if all allegations made by the plaintiff are true.30 Failure
to plead an affirmative defense may result in its waiver.31
immigration charges following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Plaintiff alleged that
he was mistreated and that his constitutional rights had been violated based
upon that treatment. Further, he claimed that Ashcroft (and FBI Director
Robert Mueller) “knew of, condoned . . . and maliciously agreed to subject”
plaintiff to harsh conditions solely on account of his inclusion in several
protected classes. The Court originally applied the Conley “notice” standard,
but Twombly was decided while the matter was on appeal. After the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied a limited interpretation
of Twombly and upheld the lower court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiff that
the claims were sufficiently pled, the Supreme Court took up the matter.
25. Id. at 678.
26. Id. (“[M]ere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
27. Id. at 678–79.
28. See id. at 684.
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including: [list of
affirmative defenses].”).
30. See, e.g., El Corte Ingles, S.A. v. City Lights, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-00213AWI-JLT, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218435, at *26 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2019).
31. See Meyers v. Vill. of Oxford, No. 17-cv-10623, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24637, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2019) (“Although there are some exceptions,
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Traditionally, simple lists of affirmative defenses were
usually sufficient so long as they provided fair notice of the
defense.32 In this way, the standard for assessing the sufficiency
of an affirmative defense was reminiscent of Conley’s notice
standard for claims.33 Even so, the courts acknowledged the
independence of Rule 8(c).34
Affirmative defenses may be challenged by motions to strike
them from the pleadings under Rule 12(f).35 Such motions will
usually be denied unless the affirmative defense’s insufficiency
is obvious and its continued inclusion in the matter would
prejudice the party moving to strike.36 Motions to strike are
strongly disfavored because they are a drastic remedy.37 Most of
it is generally understood that the failure to allege an affirmative defense in
the first responsive pleading may result in a waiver of the defense.”).
32. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Kroger Co., No. 15cv2320 JM(BLM), 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 205496, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2019) (citing Wyshak v. City
Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also Arthur R. Miller, From
Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 101 (2010) (“[D]efensive pleading[s] typically are
alleged in a formulary, conclusory, and uninformative fashion along the style
illustrated in Form 30 [of the Federal Rules].”).
33. See Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir. 1984)
(“A motion to strike an affirmative defense . . . will not be granted unless it
appears to a certainty that plaintiffs would succeed despite any state of facts
which could be proved in support of the defense.”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1274 (3d ed. 2008).
34. See, e.g., Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 657 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988); see
also FTC v. AMG Servs., No. 2:12-cv-536-GMN-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
152864, at *15 (D. Nev. Oct. 27, 2014) (“Therefore, when considering a 12(f)
motion to strike an ‘insufficient defense,’ the court finds that Twombly and
Iqbal govern Rule 8(b)(1)(A) defenses and Conley governs Rule 8(c) affirmative
defenses. Rules 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(c) are not interchangeable.”).
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f); see Strobel v. Rusch, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1325
(D.N.M. 2020) (“Rule 12(f) is intended to minimize delay, prejudice and
confusion by narrowing the issues for discovery and trial.”).
36. See Clark v. Milam, 152 F.R.D. 66, 70 (S.D. W. Va. 1993); WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1381.
37. See Harrison Co. v. A-Z Wholesalers, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-1057-B, 2020
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73191, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2020) (“Motions to strike
a portion of a pleading are generally viewed with disfavor and are seldom
granted, as such motions seek a ‘drastic remedy’ and are often sought by the
movant simply as a dilatory tactic.”); see also Ponder v. Prophete, No. 16-2376CM-GLR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152934, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 2016) (“[T]he
bar for succeeding on a motion to strike is high because courts consider striking
an affirmative defense to be a drastic remedy. Indeed, the court should only
utilize the legal tool where the challenged allegations cannot succeed under
any circumstances. The Court cannot make such a judgment with only a short
and plain statement of defenses in response to an equally, if not more so, short
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the time, affirmative defenses that do not find support in the
record simply fall by the wayside.38
III. PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN THE
DISTRICT COURTS
It was against the backdrop of the rules and practices
described briefly above that the courts began to analyze the
application and effect of the plausibility pleading standard for
claims on affirmative defenses.39 Courts found merits on both
sides of the question. This Section will address the main
arguments presented by both sides of the issue, as well as the
trends and the majority position.
A. Arguments in Favor of Extension
The courts that select to extend the plausibility pleading
standard to affirmative defenses offer a fairly uniform collection
of reasoning to support their decisions. These analyses most
frequently turn upon somewhat soft notions of expediency and
fairness.
Perhaps the most commonly-stated justifications for
extending the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative
defenses relate to mitigation of discovery abuses and the
streamlining of defensive pleadings.40 By extending plausibility
pleading, these courts and the litigants before them gain
something in efficiency and judicial economy.41 These courts
and plain statement of the claim. This is especially true where discovery has
not yet commenced.”); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1380.
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Moseley, No.
14-00789-CV-W-DW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185450, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 26,
2015); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (D.
Minn. 2010).
39. See Gambol, supra note 1, at 2195 (“After Twombly, the continued
validity of the traditional manners of pleading affirmative defenses and
determining their sufficiency [were] in doubt.”); see also Falley v. Friends
Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1256 (D. Kan. 2011) (“The issue before the court
is whether the pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative
defenses, or only complaints.”).
40. See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Saginaw, No. 17-cv-11067, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11114, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2020); Racick v. Dominion L. Assocs.,
270 F.R.D. 228, 233 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (“[B]oilerplate defenses clutter the docket
and . . . create unnecessary work and extend discovery.”).
41. See, e.g., McGinity v. USAA Fed. Savs. Bank, No. 5:19-cv-560-BO, slip
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find further support in their analysis of the “underlying
rationale” of Twombly and Iqbal: to eliminate fishing
expeditions and reduce the cost associated with discovery.42
These courts equate the costs associated with meritless claims
to those fostered by meritless affirmative defenses.43
Some courts that choose to extend plausibility pleading to
affirmative defenses seek to support that position by parsing the
Federal Rules.
Usually, this interpretation hinges upon
similarities between language in Rule 8(a) and Rule 8(b), which
governs the pleading of “Defenses; Admissions and Denials.”44
These courts, perhaps anticipating a counterargument, frame
Rule 8(c) as a subset of Rule 8(b), where Rule 8(c) exists to add
additional requirements on the pleading of affirmative defenses
and offers a list of examples, but is otherwise subsumed by Rule
8(b).45
There is a notion among courts that choose to extend that
the application of a different standard of support for a claim and
a defense is definitionally unfair.46 A more specific variant of
this argument is that because both claims and affirmative
defenses are pleadings; the standard for “pleadings” should be,

op. at 2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2020); FDIC v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, LLC,
No. 08-81536, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74683, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009).
42. See Johnson v. City of Saginaw, No. 17-cv-13174, 2018 WL 6168036,
at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 2018); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F.
Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
43. PetroJebla, SA de C.V. v. Betron Enters., No. 19-11439, 2019 WL
6496565, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2019); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp.,
No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 2558015 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008).
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b); see also Espitia v. Mezzetti Fin. Servs., Inc.,
No. 18-cv-02480-VKD, 2019 WL 359422, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019);
Hayden v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1129 (D. Or. 2014) (“[A] party
is held to the same ‘short and plain’ content requirement whether asserting a
claim for relief or asserting a defense to a claim for relief. The drafters could
have used different language or phrases to describe parties’ duties when
asserting a claim for relief or a defense (or affirmative defense), but they did
not.”); Vogel v. Huntington Oaks Del. Partners, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 438, 440–41
(C.D. Cal. 2013); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691–
93 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
45. See Gomez v. Bird Auto., LLC, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1337 (S.D. Fla.
2019); Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649 (D. Kan. 2009).
46. Andean Life, LLC v. Barry Callebaut U.S.A. LLC, No. 20-20765-CivWilliams/Torres, 2020 WL 1703552, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2020); Palmer v.
Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5 (W.D. Va. June
24, 2010).
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and is, the same.47
These courts acknowledge that there might be some
prejudice to defendants by having their defenses struck for being
insufficiently pled at an early stage of litigation or because
defendants have a limited timeframe in which to respond.48 But
even so, they feel that a liberal construction of Rule 15 should
ameliorate the problem by allowing defendants to amend their
answer.49
B. Arguments Against Extension
The courts that decline to extend the plausibility pleading
standard to affirmative defenses usually turn at the first (and
sometimes only) instance to Twombly, Iqbal, and the Rules
themselves. Twombly and Iqbal specifically interpreted Rule
8(a) and do not even mention Rule 8(c).50 As noted above, Rule
8(a) governs the pleading of claims, and Rule 8(c) governs
47. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, No. 17-cv-11067, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11114, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2020); Racick v. Dominion L. Assocs., 270
F.R.D. 228, 233 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (“[W]hat is good for the goose is good for the
gander.”); In re Mission Bay Ski & Bike, Inc., Nos. 07 B 20870, 08 A 55, 2009
WL 2913438, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009) (citations omitted)
(“Affirmative defenses are pleadings and so are subject to all pleading
requirements under the Federal Rules. . . That means affirmative defenses
must meet the notice–pleading standards of Rule 8(a).”); Pylant v. Cuba, No.
3:14-CV-0745-P, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189656, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2015)
(pointing out that this argument is overstated, where it stems from Rule 8(e)’s
requirement that all pleadings must be “simple, concise, and direct”).
48. Vogel, 291 F.R.D. at 441; Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-737,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *15 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010).
49. See McGinity v. USAA Fed. Savs. Bank, No. 5:19-cv-560-BO, slip op.
at 3 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2020); Racick, 270 F.R.D. at 234; Palmer, 2010 WL
2605179, at *6 (“Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates
that motions to amend pleadings on that basis of relevant facts learned during
discovery, and such motions should be liberally granted.”).
50. Daley v. Scott, No. 2:15-cv-269-FtM-29DNF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
83735, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2016) (“[N]either Twombly nor Iqbal
addressed whether Rule 8(c) requires an affirmative defense, like a claim for
relief, to be pled with ‘enough facts’ to show that [it] is plausible on its face.”);
Sprint Sols., Inc. v. Shoukry, No. 2:14-cv-00127, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152851,
at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 2014) (“As numerous courts have observed, Iqbal and
Twombly analyzed only complaints and Rule 8(a)(2).”); Paleteria La
Michoacana v. Productos Lacteos, 905 F. Supp. 2d 189, 190 (D.D.C. 2012)
(“Iqbal and Twombly interpreted Rule 8(a)(2), which sets forth the pleading
requirements for a complaint. Affirmative defenses are governed by a different
provision, Rule 8(c).”). See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2011).
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affirmative defenses.51 While Rule 8(a) requires “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,” Rule 8(c) requires merely that “a party must
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”52 The
plausibility pleading standard hinges upon Rule 8(a)’s
requirement of a “showing.”53 However, Rule 8(c) does not
require any “showing” by a defendant.54 Accordingly, the text of
the Rules shows that the plausibility pleading standard applies
only to claims plead pursuant to Rule 8(a) and does not apply to
affirmative defenses plead pursuant to Rule 8(c).55
Many courts that decline to extend plausibility pleading
point to the difference in time available to the parties to a
lawsuit to formulate their pleadings. In this view, it is not fair
to hold the parties to the same standard of factual support where
51. See, e.g., Vazquez-Robles v. CommoLoCo, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d 138,
149 (D.P.R. 2016) (“[I]n Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court interpreted
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which sets forth the pleading
requirements for a complaint and employs different language, governs a
different pleading, and affects a different stage of the litigation than Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), which governs affirmative defenses.”).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), (c); see United States v. All Assets Held at Bank
Julius Baer & Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 135, 144 (D.D.C. 2017).
53. E.g., Vann v. Inst. of Nuclear Power Operations, Inc., No. 1:09-CV1169-CC-LTW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165320 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2011); see
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3
54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); see also United States ex rel. Patzer v. Sikorsky
Aircraft Corp., 382 F. Supp. 3d 860, 866 (E.D. Wis. 2019); Henry v. Ocwen Loan
Servicing, LLC, No. 17cv0688 JM(NLS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30779, at *6–
7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 592 (D.N.M. 2011)
(“The Court agrees with the latter cases that rule 8(c), which provides the
requirements for pleading affirmative defenses, does not require factual
support.”); Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 01-119, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 116358, at *12–13 (D.V.I. Dec. 8, 2009); Am. Res. Ins. Co. v.
Evoleno Co., No. 07-0035-WS-M, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55181, at *6 n.7 (S.D.
Ala. July 30, 2007).
55. Craten v. Foster Poultry Farms Inc., No. CV-15-02587-PHX-DLR, slip
op. at 4 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2016); Jam Tire, Inc. v. Harbin, No. 3:14-cv-00489,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124581, at *6–8 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2014) (“I am
required to give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning. . . .
To apply a plausibility standard to affirmative defenses would place an
unrealistic burden on defendants irreconcilable with the plain meaning of Rule
8(c) and the overriding consideration that pleadings ‘must be construed so as
to do justice.’”); Flame S.A. v. Indus. Carriers, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-658, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 86662, at *5 (E.D. Va. June 24, 2014); EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters.,
281 F.R.D. 660, 662 (M.D. Ala. 2012); Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food,
Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1218 (JCC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2265, at *5 (E.D. Va. Jan.
10, 2011) (“[The Court] is first bound to apply the relevant rules of civil
procedure as written.”).
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plaintiffs have years to develop their positions while defendants
have to respond within, usually, twenty-one days.56 Therefore,
the equities support maintaining separate standards.57
Courts that decline to extend plausibility pleading also
regularly explain how the policy and practical concerns
expressed in Twombly and Iqbal—relating to judicial efficiency
and cost savings to parties—are advanced by declining to
extend. First, extending plausibility pleading is likely to cause
a great increase in the volume of motions to strike affirmative
defenses.58 But nearly all motions to strike affirmative defenses
are without value.59 And any inefficiencies caused by simply56. Bigfoot on the Strip, LLC v. Winchester, No. 18-3155-CV-S-BP, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173447, at *4–5 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2018); Henry, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30779, at *7–8 (“[A] plaintiff may investigate a potential claim for
weeks, months, or even years before filing a complaint. To expect a defendant
to retain counsel, investigate claims, adequately prepare an answer, and to
plead affirmative defenses with particularity within 21 days of service of the
complaint . . . would seem to be unrealistic in most cases[.]”); Craten, slip op.
at 5; Vann, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165320, at *13–14.
57. Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051 (D.
Minn. 2010) (“Whatever one thinks of Iqbal and Twombly, the ‘plausibility’
requirement that they impose is more fairly imposed on plaintiffs who have
years to investigate than on defendants who have 21 days.”).
58. See, e.g., Ross v. Sharp One, Inc., No. 19-2293-KHV, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 179162, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2019) (“Applying Twombly and Iqbal to
affirmative defenses would ‘invite many more motions to strike, which achieves
little.’”); Bayer CropScience A.G. v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 10-1045
RMB/JS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149636, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (declining
to extend plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses based in part on “the
fact that a heightened pleading requirement would produce more motions to
strike, which are disfavored” and “the low likelihood that motions to strike
affirmative defenses would expedite the litigation, given that leave to amend
is routinely granted”); cf. Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-737, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *10–11 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) (anticipating the
onrush of mostly useless motion practice that its decision to extend plausibility
pleading will cause and requesting plaintiffs not do that).
59. See Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 07-80551-CIVMARRA/JOHNSON, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42630, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla. May 28,
2008) (listing many cases that have described motions to strike as “time
wasters”); see also Green v. Obsu, No. ELH-19-2068, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26183, at *15 (D. Md. Feb. 13, 2020) (“Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed
with disfavor because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and
because it is often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.”); Moore v.
R. Craig Hemphill & Assocs., No. 3:13-cv-900-J-39-PDB, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Fla.
May 6, 2014) (“Persuaded by the latter approach and its fidelity to both the
rule that a court must give effect to a law that has plain and unambiguous
meaning . . . and the longstanding adversity to striking an affirmative defense
unless it does not have any possible connection to the controversy and might
prejudice a party if it remains (an adversity left untouched by Iqbal and
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pled affirmative defenses are, at most, slight.60 Second,
discovery is limited to the pleadings.61 Discovery will be more
contentious as plaintiffs resist defendants’ attempts to develop
factual support for affirmative defenses that they were
prevented from pleading.62 Third, defendants who wait to plead
affirmative defenses, or who have had previously-pled
affirmative defenses struck, will be forced later to move to
amend their pleadings after some discovery has taken place.63
And no matter how liberal the standards are in favor of
amendment, plaintiffs will surely resist defendants’ requests,
adding yet another round of motion practice.64 All told,
extending plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses
inexorably encourages a cavalcade of wasteful motion practice.65
Twombly), the Court applies that approach here.”).
60. See Traincroft, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., No. 14-10551-FDS, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 85170, at *10 (D. Mass. June 23, 2014) (“[A]ffirmative defenses
generally add little marginal cost.”); Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *4 n.9 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010) (noting
the “utter lack of meaningful prejudice” presented by the continued existence
of defendant’s affirmative defenses).
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
62. See Laporte v. Bureau Veritas N. Am. Inc., No. 1:12-cv-09543, slip op.
at 4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2013) (“The Court would also like to avoid the discovery
disputes that would inevitably develop as a defendant seeks discovery related
to affirmative defenses it had not stated in its answer.”); Leon v. Jacobson
Transp. Co., No. 10 C 4939, 2010 WL 4810600, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2010).
63. Henry v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 17cv0688 JM(NLS), 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30779, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018) (“[A] heightened
pleading standard may require the court to address multiple motions to amend
the answer as discovery reveals additional defenses.”); Florilli Transp. v. W.
Express, Inc., No. 14-CV-00988-DW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185459, at *4
(W.D. Mo. Feb. 20, 2015) (“[T]hen, after taking discovery, [defendants will
need] to move the Court for permission to amend their answers to add
affirmative defenses . . . Thus, another round of motion practice would be added
to many cases, increasing the burdens on the federal courts, and adding
expense and delay for the parties.”).
64. See United States ex rel. Patzer v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 382 F.
Supp. 3d 860, 867 (E.D. Wis. 2019); Bigfoot on the Strip, LLC v. Winchester,
No. 18-3155-CV-S-BP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173447, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 9,
2018) (“Plaintiffs would often resist those motions on the grounds that the
proposed affirmative defenses would be futile. Thus, another round of motion
practice would be added to many cases, increasing the burdens on the federal
courts, and adding expense and delay for the parties.”); Wells Fargo & Co. v.
United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (D. Minn. 2010).
65. Ross v. Sharp One, Inc., No. 19-2293-KHV, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
179162, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2019) (“Finally, the Court does not want to
‘encourage parties to bog down litigation by filing and fighting motions to
strike answers or defenses prematurely.’ The goal of Rule 12(f) is to ‘minimize
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C. The “Majority” Position That Isn’t
Around the time of the author’s previous work on this
subject, a few dozen district courts had weighed in and most had
ruled that plausibility pleading also applied to the pleading of
affirmative defenses.66 Today, however, thousands of cases have
addressed the issue.67 While many courts still select to extend
the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses, that
is no longer the majority position.68 Rather, the movement in
the district courts over the last decade has been decidedly away
from the extension of the plausibility pleading standard to
affirmative defenses.69 Courts selecting not to extend the
plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses now
comprise a sizable majority.70
delay, prejudice, and confusion.’”); Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 382 F. Supp. 3d at
867 (“What would clog the docket clutter [sic] is applying a rigorous pleading
standard to affirmative defenses.”); Ponder v. Prophete, No. 16-2376-CM-GLR,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152934, at *1–4 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 2016); cf. Barnes v.
AT&T Pension Benefit Plan, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1175–76 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(“It is the court’s opinion that while plaintiff partially succeeded on the merits
of his motion, the issues raised would not have been difficult to address solely
between the parties.”).
66. Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 589–90 nn.5–6 (D.N.M. 2011) (listing
cases); Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
67. See Brian Soucek & Remington B. Lamons, Heightened Pleading
Standards for Defendants: A Case Study of Court-Counting Precedent, 70 ALA.
L. REV. 875 (2019); Justin Rand, Tightening Twiqbal: Why Plausibility Must
Be Confined to the Complaint, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 79 (2016).
68. Soucek & Lamons, supra note 67; Hansen v. R.I.’s Only 24 Hour Truck
& Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 119, 122 (D. Mass. 2012) (noting that the weight
of a majority had recently flipped).
69. Soucek & Lamons, supra note 67, at 891–95 (finding in a laborious
study that the majority view among the district courts has been against
extending the plausibility pleading standard since August of 2011 and that, as
of the time of their writing, more than sixty-two percent of the decisions to
squarely address the question, and seventy-one percent in the Second Circuit,
selected not to extend); see Goldsmith v. Lee Enters., No. 4:19CV1772 HEA,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178132, at *10–11 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2019); Benedict v.
Hankook Tire Co., No. 3:17-cv-109, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26129, at *6 (E.D.
Va. Feb. 16, 2018); Hand Held Prods., Inc. v. Code Corp., No. 17-167-RMG,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89271, at *18 (D.S.C. June 9, 2017); Advanced Pain
Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Wadhwa, No. MJG-12-3579, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7703,
at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2014).
70. Whetstone Indus., Inc. v. Yowie Grp., Ltd., No. 3:17-cv-1286-J-20PDB,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177086, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2019) (noting a
majority among courts selecting not to extend the plausibility pleading
standard to affirmative defenses); Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc.,
264 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“The overwhelming majority view,
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Despite this reality, there persists a continuing
misapprehension that a majority of the district courts support
the extension of the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative
defenses. This error can be traced to some of the earliest
decisions to consider the issue, when, indeed, it was not an error.
The first reference to a nascent majority position on the issue
appears to have been in Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc.71 Hayne
was decided a mere seven months after Iqbal and offered a count
of nine-to-three in favor of extension.72 About five months later,
the court in Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan73 cited to
Hayne in support of its proposition that “the vast majority of
courts presented with the issue have extended Twombly’s
heightened pleading standard to affirmative defenses.”74 This
proposition was challenged at the time.75 Even so, Barnes
currently has over 300 citing decisions, and some courts persist
in citing to Barnes for its “vast majority” language.76 This
practice is not supportable and should be ended.77
to which I subscribe, is that the concept of plausibility has no application to
affirmative defenses.”). See generally Soucek & Lamons, supra note 67, at 891.
71. Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649–50 (D. Kan.
2009).
72. Id. at 650 & n.15.
73. Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
74. Id. at 1171 (“[T]he vast majority of courts presented with the issue
have extended Twombly’s heightened pleading standard to affirmative
defenses.”).
75. See, e.g., Riemer v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 274 F.R.D. 637, 640 n.3
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (“While it may be a stretch to say of the more than 100 cases
that have considered the applicability of Iqbal and Twombly to affirmative
defenses that the ‘vast majority of . . . districts’ are in favor of the application,
it does appear that a majority are.”).
76. See, e.g., OMS Collections, Ltd. v. Tien, No. 19-23471-CivWILLIAMS/TORRES, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14281, at *11–12 (S.D. Fla. Jan.
27, 2020); Romero v. Makan, No. 5:18-CV-353-ODW (SHKx), 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 111334, at 3 & n.2 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2018).
77. Continued relevance harkens to the worrisome possibility of selective
counting among the district courts, which is worse yet when decisions are
rendered based in some part on the weight of an erroneously believed majority
position. See Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167; Soucek & Lamons, supra note 67,
at 902–11. By way of a simplified example, in the Northern District of Indiana
(just to pick a jurisdiction), there are now more cases that have declined to
extend the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses than there
were to support Hayne’s point that a majority existed favoring extension. See,
e.g., Keller v. Enhanced Recovery Co., No. 4:18-cv-15, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
186043 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 31, 2018); Droz v. Droz, No. 2:17-cv-00451-RL-JEM,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111761 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2018); Reger v. Ariz. RV Ctrs.,
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Further, the majority declining to extend the plausibility
pleading standard to affirmative defenses becomes even more
commanding when one considers courts and not just decisions.
There is a small yet active minority of courts in which a very
large number of pro-extension cases are decided.78 These courts
appear to grant such motions readily, and, accordingly, plaintiffs
appear to be bombarding these courts with motions to strike
affirmative defenses that might not be granted in other
jurisdictions.79 Among other problems, these activities inflate

LLC, No. 3:16-CV-778-MGG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89773 (N.D. Ind. May 30,
2018); Briley v. Lawson, No. 3:17-CV-522-JD-MGG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
80624 (N.D. Ind. May 14, 2018); Maloy v. Stucky, Lauer & Young, LLP, No.
1:17-CV-336-TLS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58084 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 5, 2018);
Friend v. Taylor Law, PLLC, No. 4:17-CV-29-JVB-PRC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
203695 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2017); Markel Ins. Co. v. United Emergency Med.
Servs., LLC, No. 2:16-CV-220-JVB-PRC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34266 (N.D.
Ind. Mar. 10, 2017); Design Basics, LLC v. Windsor Homes, Inc., No. 1:16-cv00051-PPS-SLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91910 (N.D. Ind. July 14, 2016);
Husainy v. Allied Collection Serv., Inc., No. 4:15-CV-95-JVB-PRC, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 54003 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 22, 2016); Fletcher v. Hoeppner Wagner &
Evans, LLP, No. 2:14-CV-231-RL-PRC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153057 (N.D.
Ind. Nov. 12, 2015); Cottle v. Falcon Holdings Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:11-CV-95PRC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10478 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2012). But in reality,
this fact offers no insights into whether this district, the Seventh Circuit, or
the nation on the whole tilts one way or the other. Indeed, the court in Hayne
offered no suggestion that its count was exhaustive (and it was not), but that
did not prevent it from spawning the “majority” myth. See Home Mgmt. Sols.,
Inc. v. Prescient, Inc., No. 07-20608-CIV-LENARD/TORRES, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 61608, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2007). The author’s previous work on
this topic warned against the risk of courts feeling pressured to comport with
a “majority” position. Gambol, supra note 1, at 2207 (“The action within the
district courts presents a very real danger of snowballing.”). It appears that
this admonition proved prescient.
78. Soucek & Lamons, supra note 67, at 894.
79. See, e.g., Gomez v. Bird Auto., LLC, 411 F. Supp. 3d. 1332, 1338 (S.D.
Fla. 2019) (“When coupling the three considerations discussed above with the
fact that a majority of courts have agreed with this position, we hold that there
is no separate standard for complaints and affirmative defenses in connection
with Rule 8. See, e.g., Barnes . . . see also Hayne.”); Pollo Campestre, S.A. DE
C.V. v. Campero, Inc., No. 19-Civ-20001-SCOLA/TORRES, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 186749, at *10–11 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2019) (“When combining these
considerations with the fact that a majority of courts have agreed with this
position, we hold that there is no separate standard under Rule 8 for a
complaint and an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Barnes . . . see also Hayne.”);
Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 333 F.R.D. 594, 599 (S.D.
Fla. 2019) (“When coupling the three considerations discussed above with the
fact that a majority of courts have agreed with this position, we hold that there
is no separate standard for complaints and affirmative defenses in connection
with Rule 8. See, e.g., Barnes . . . see also Hayne.”); Tokio Marine Specialty Ins.
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the number of decisions in favor of extension. In other words,
absent a few outlier jurisdictions offering an outsized number of
decisions on this subject, the majority of cases and courts in
favor of not extending the plausibility pleading standard to
affirmative defenses is overwhelming.
IV. ACTION AT THE CIRCUIT LEVEL
The Second Circuit recently became the first United States
Court of Appeals to rule explicitly on whether to extend the
plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses. In
GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc.,80 the Second Circuit
answered that question in the affirmative. This Section will
review the Second Circuit’s GEOMC decision and examine a
number of questions and issues that the decision presents. It
will also address briefly how other circuit courts have suggested
that they might approach the issue.
A. The Second Circuit’s Decision in GEOMC Co. v.
Calmare Therapeutics Inc.
At the trial level, the GEOMC matter sounded broadly in
breach of contract, where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had failed to pay for certain medical devices that the plaintiff
had manufactured for the defendant, resulting in the plaintiff’s
right to payment and fees.81 The trial court agreed and found
for the plaintiff on a number of counts on summary judgment.82

Co. v. Ramos, No. 19-22069-CIV-SCOLA/TORRES, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
160301, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2019) (“When coupling the three
considerations discussed above with the fact that a majority of courts have
agreed with this position, we hold that there is no separate standard for
complaints and affirmative defenses in connection with Rule 8. See, e.g.,
Barnes . . . see also Hayne.”); Rubinstein v. Keshet Inter Vivos Tr., No. 1761019-Civ-WILLIAMS/TORRES, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99428, at *15–16
(S.D. Fla. June 13, 2019) (“When coupling the three considerations discussed
above with the fact that a majority of courts have agreed with this position, we
hold that there is no separate standard for complaints and affirmative defenses
in connection with Rule 8. See, e.g., Barnes . . . see also Hayne.”).
80. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2019).
81. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., No. 3:14-cv-01222 (VAB),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162353 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2017).
82. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., No. 3:14-cv-01222 (VAB),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131986 (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2017).
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A later trial established the quantum of damages.83
In March of 2019, the Second Circuit issued a pair of
opinions, the first of which vacated and remanded the matter for
various reasons.84 The Second Circuit rendered a separate
opinion, affirming the lower court’s previous ruling to strike two
of the defendant’s affirmative defenses and some
counterclaims.85 The affirmative defenses at issue were the
defendant’s claims that the plaintiff’s damages were caused by
its own negligence and that the plaintiff had failed to join a
necessary party.86
The Second Circuit offers this second opinion specifically to
“clarify the standards for pleading affirmative defenses and
granting a motion to strike them.”87 It begins by recounting the
procedural posture of the “complicated” case below.88 After the
plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the defendant timely
answered.89 Nine months later, the defendant sought leave to
amend its answer to add affirmative defenses and
counterclaims.90 This request was opposed while the plaintiff
simultaneously sought leave to file a second amended complaint
to add an additional claim.91 The Second Circuit states that the
situation was “unusual,” as was the lower court’s solution: to
deny the defendant leave to amend its answer to the amended
complaint, to grant the concurrent motion for the plaintiff to
amend its complaint again, and to permit the defendant to file
an answer to the second amended complaint.92 At the same
time, the lower court invited the plaintiff to move to strike
should the defendant “exceed[] the scope of permissible
amendment.”93 The plaintiff filed its second amended complaint,
83. GEOMC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162353.
84. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 768 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir.
2019).
85. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 94–95 (citing GEOMC Co. v. Calmare
Therapeutics Inc., No. 3:14-CV-01222 (VAB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144735,
at *5–6 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2016)).
86. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 99.
87. Id. at 94. The Court also sought to clarify the standard for presenting
and challenging new counterclaims, but that is beyond the scope of this article.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (“In effect, [the lower court] authorized the Plaintiff to use a motion
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the defendant filed its answer (with added affirmative defenses
and counterclaims), the plaintiff moved to strike, and the lower
court granted the motion in part.94 The defendant appealed.95
The Second Circuit prefaces its review with the observation
that some lower courts have “not always distinguished between
affirmative defenses in a timely filed answer and those later
filed, either with or without court permission to amend an
answer, especially those filed in late stages of litigation.”96 It
then delineates the Federal Rules that articulate the periods
within which defendants may timely file affirmative defenses
under different circumstances.97
The Second Circuit’s “starting point” is Rule 12(f) regarding
motions to strike.98 It traces the history of the standard
governing motions to strike affirmative defenses in its circuit
from the adoption of the Federal Rules.99 The Second Circuit
notes that it did not address the pleading standard necessary for
affirmative defenses to survive a motion to strike for many
years.100 When it did articulate a standard for adjudging the
sufficiency of a pled affirmative defense, that standard broadly
mirrored the Conley notice standard for pled claims.101 The
Second Circuit notes that the Conley standard for claims was
abrogated by Twombly and was replaced by a plausibility
standard.102
to strike under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to raise
whatever issues it would have raised in opposition to the Defendant’s motion
to amend its answer under Rule 15(a)(2).”).
94. Id. at 94–95.
95. Id. at 95.
96. Id. (noting the “uncertainty” this practice has caused).
97. Id. (listing Rules 12(a)(1)(A)(i), 15(a)(1)(A), 15(a)(2), and 15(a)(3), each
of which require or permit defendants to submit affirmative defenses at
different times).
98. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f)(1), (2)) (“Rule 12(f) . . . provides that a
court may strike ‘from a pleading’ any ‘insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.’”).
99. Id. at 95–96.
100. Id. at 96.
101. Id. at 95–96 (“[A] motion to strike an affirmative defense, apparently
timely filed, will not be granted unless ‘it appears to a certainty that plaintiffs
would succeed despite any state of the facts which could be proved in support
of the defense.’” (quoting William Z. Salcer, Panfeld, Edelman v. Envicon
Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 478
U.S. 1015 (1986))).
102. Id. at 96.
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The Second Circuit describes how a district court in SEC v.
McCaskey103 derived elements of review from the Second
Circuit’s previous guidance and articulated a test to review a
motion to strike an affirmative defense; the test has been used
and modified by other courts.104 To prevail on a motion to strike
an affirmative defense, the McCaskey test requires: “a plaintiff
must show that: (1) there is no question of fact which might allow
the defense to succeed; (2) there is no question of law which
might allow the defense to succeed; and (3) the plaintiff would
be prejudiced by the inclusion of the defense.”105 The Second
Circuit ultimately applies the McCaskey approach.106 It admits,
however, that the court below did not cite to or apply the
McCaskey standard, but rather a standard properly applied to
the pleading of claims.107
Perhaps because of this confusion, the Second Circuit takes
the opportunity “to clarify the factors relevant to striking an
affirmative defense.”108 “To avoid having district courts continue
to repeat the three-factor formulation as worded in McCaskey,
we consider each of those factors in turn.”109
The Second Circuit first asks whether the first factor of the
McCaskey test should be modified in the wake of Twombly.110 It
notes that the issue “has divided the many district courts and
commentators that have considered it.”111 The Second Circuit

103. SEC v. McCaskey, 56 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
104. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 96–97 & n.6 (“Fifteen years after Salcer, a
District Court in this Circuit purported to extract from that opinion a threepart test . . . This formulation divided Salcer’s reference to facts into two
factors, one concerned with facts, and the other concerned with law. The
McCaskey formulation also added a third factor, prejudice to the plaintiff, a
factor not mentioned in Salcer.”).
105. Id. at 96 (quoting McCaskey, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 326).
106. Id. at 97–99 (applying McCaskey, with some criticisms).
107. Id. at 97 & n.7.
108. Id. at 97.
109. Id.
110. Id. (“[At issue is] [w]hether the first of the McCaskey factors should
be reworded in light of Twombly, i.e., whether Twombly applies to the pleading
of affirmative defenses.”).
111. Id. at 97 & n.8 (“Three comprehensive articles take three different
approaches. One article favors applying Twombly to affirmative defenses. One
opposes applying Twombly to affirmative defenses. One proposes a ‘middleground approach.’”). In a footnote, the Second Circuit compares three cases on
the pro-extension side—Perez v. Gordon & Wong L. Grp., P.C., No. 11-CV03323-LHK, 2012 WL 1029425 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012); HCRI TRS Acquirer,
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immediately “conclude[s] that the plausibility standard of
Twombly applies to determining the sufficiency of all pleadings,
including the pleading of an affirmative defense, but with
recognition that, as the Supreme Court explained in Iqbal,
applying the plausibility standard to any pleading is a ‘contextspecific’ task.”112
“The key aspect of the context relevant to the standard for
pleading an affirmative defense is that an affirmative defense,
rather than a complaint, is at issue. This is relevant to the
degree of rigor appropriate for testing the pleading of an
affirmative defense.”113 The Second Circuit notes that plaintiffs
have years to develop factual plausibility for their claims, while
defendants must respond within a few weeks.114 Further, it
instructs that a court applying its standard must consider the
nature of the specific affirmative defense pled, and that
sometimes a “relaxed” standard should apply.115
The Second Circuit does not modify the second or third
factors of the McCaskey test.116 However, it does clarify that the
third factor—prejudice—should infrequently be a basis for
striking an otherwise valid affirmative defense because an
effective defense should prejudice a plaintiff.117
Based upon these considerations, the Second Circuit
reexamines the lower court’s decision to strike two of the

LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Tracy v. NVR, Inc., No. 04CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009)—to three cases on the
anti-extension side—Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 264 F. Supp.
3d 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co. v. Wi-LAN, Inc., No. 12
Civ.7900(SAS), 2013 WL 2322675 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2013); Lane v. Page, 272
F.R.D. 581 (D.N.M. 2011). Id. at n.8. The Second Circuit also notes that 2
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 12.37[4] (3d ed. 2018)
states that the “better view” is that Twombly does not extend and cites to
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1274 for the proposition that Wright &
Miller do not offer an opinion on the matter. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97–98.
112. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009)).
113. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98.
114. Id. (“That aspect of the context matters.”).
115. Id. (“For example, the facts needed to plead a statute-of-limitations
defense will usually be readily available; the facts needed to plead an ultra
vires defense, for example, may not be readily known to the defendant, a
circumstance warranting a relaxed application of the plausibility standard.”).
116. Id. at 98–99.
117. Id. (noting that the exception is if the defense is offered “beyond the
normal times limits of the Rules”).
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defendant’s affirmative defenses. Although the district court
had permitted the defendant to file an answer, the Second
Circuit reminds us that the defendant had been warned against
expanding the scope of the matter and agreed that these
defenses “introduce[d] vague allegations regarding the actions of
unnamed third parties, raising concerns of both legal sufficiency
and prejudice to GEOMC.”118 Further, the Second Circuit notes
that the answer in which these affirmative defenses had been
proffered did not indicate to what actions or parties the
Accordingly,
affirmative defenses at issue pertained.119
“[s]triking these two affirmative defenses was within the
District Court’s discretion.”120
[Defendants] needed to support these defenses
with some factual allegations to make them
plausible. Moreover, both affirmative defenses
were presented at a late stage of the litigation.
Although the defenses were presented soon after
[the plaintiff] filed its second amended complaint,
they were not aimed at the one new cause of action
. . . Expanding the litigation at that stage would
have been prejudicial to [the plaintiff].121
The Second Circuit then proceeds to consider questions
related to the defendant’s dismissed counterclaims.122
B. Challenges Presented by the Second Circuit’s Decision
The Second Circuit’s stated intention in drafting the
GEOMC decision was to “clarify” matters relating to the
pleading of affirmative defenses and resolving motions to strike
them. Unfortunately, it does not seem likely that the Second
Circuit’s decision will meaningfully affect that goal. While the
lower courts in the Second Circuit must follow the GEOMC

118. Id. at 99 (quoting GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc, No. 3:14cv-01222(VAB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114735, at *14 (D. Conn. Oct. 19,
2016)).
119. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 99.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 99–102.
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precedent, rather than offer solutions, GEOMC instead raises a
number of new questions and muddies a number of waters.
1. The Second Circuit Forgoes Support or Analysis
The primary difficulty of the GEOMC decision is that the
Second Circuit offers literally no analysis or support for its
ruling that the plausibility pleading standard applies to
Rather, the Second Circuit
affirmative defenses.123
acknowledges that there is a difference of opinion among district
courts and commentators, states flatly that the plausibility
pleading standard now applies to affirmative defenses, and then
moves directly into a discussion of the degree of rigor that should
be applied to its newly-created standard.124
The Second Circuit does not indulge a single reference to
Rule 8(c), or indeed any part of Rule 8, the actual Rule at issue
and upon which the instant decision imposes an
interpretation.125 This omission is particularly conspicuous
because the Second Circuit quotes language from, and delves
into the distinct requirements of, several other Federal Rules.126
As noted, the difference in language between Rules 8(a) and 8(c),
particularly in light of the fact that Twombly and Iqbal
specifically and exclusively deal with Rule 8(a), is perhaps the
foremost and most powerful argument that courts consider when
selecting not to extend the plausibility pleading standard to
affirmative defenses.127 It is very problematic that the Second
Circuit fails to address this point. Given the cases and
commentaries that the Second Circuit references, it seems
improbable that its silence is inadvertent.128 We are left to
speculate about what the Second Circuit intended to
communicate by omitting this point that is directly relevant and,
indeed, determinative to the issue at hand.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See id. at 98–99.
See id. at 99.
See id. passim.
Id. at 95.
See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
See GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97.
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2. The Authority the Second Circuit Cites Does Not
Support Its Conclusion
The Second Circuit’s reasoning behind its decision that
Twombly should apply to affirmative defenses is even more
challenging to reconstruct based upon its citations. Indeed, the
authority the Second Circuit selects to reference does not appear
to support its conclusion.129
First, in discussing the divergence of opinion, the Second
Circuit appears to have crafted its account to be largely balanced
between the opposing sides. It references three pro-extension
cases and three anti-extension cases; it cites to three
commentaries: one pro-extension, one anti-extension, and one
that it describes as in the middle; and it cites to the leading
procedural treatises, one anti-extension and one that it believes
does not offer an opinion.130 This balanced manner of the Second
Circuit stymies one possible approach to understanding its
reasoning. If it had cited only anti-extension articles, for
instance, a reader could probably assume that it found those
pieces persuasive. But because the Second Circuit leveled the
field and does not offer further support or analysis as discussed
above,131 a reader is challenged to infer what reasoning the
Second Circuit may have found germane, or what references it
may have found persuasive.132
On a closer inspection of the cited authority, the Second
Circuit predominantly uses references that oppose extending
129. Some trouble with GEOMC’s citations is foreshadowed by the Second
Circuit’s formulation of the question before it: “Whether the first of the
McCaskey factors should be reworded in light of Twombly . . . is an issue that
has divided the many district courts and commentators that have considered
it.” Id. But, strictly speaking, none of the cases, commentaries, or treatises
referenced address McCaskey or its factors on this question. Rather than
addressing an existing issue, GEOMC may have created one.
130. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97.
131. See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text.
132. It is also worth noting that the Second Circuit’s balance is artificial.
As discussed previously, there is a robust majority of cases nationally that have
declined to extend Twombly to affirmative defenses. See supra notes 67–69
and accompanying text. In the Second Circuit, there was an even more
commanding majority opposed. See id. Further, the Second Circuit’s
presentation of three articles that address the issue omits reference to the
dozens of other pieces of scholarship that have addressed the issue, a majority
of which, much like the majority of courts, argue against extension. E.g.,
Gambol, supra note 1.
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Twombly to affirmative defenses. Among cases on the proextension side, the court cites two out-of-circuit cases and one incircuit case decided four months after Iqbal in 2009.133 Among
cases on the anti-extension side, the court cites one out-of-circuit
case and two in-circuit cases from 2017 and 2013.134 While the
Second Circuit is, of course, able to cite to whatever authority it
pleases and is not bound by any lower court precedent in its
district, it certainly feels odd that it has selected to reference a
greater number of more recent case law from within its own
circuit on the anti-extension side.
More emphatically, however, do the commentaries and
treatises the Second Circuit cites reject extension. As noted, the
court references three commentaries, where one favors the
application of Twombly to affirmative defenses, one opposes
such application, and one “proposes ‘a middle-ground
approach.’”135 But this is not a fair representation of the third
article, which argues decisively against extension.136 Indeed, the
brief language that the court cites comes from a section entitled
“V. Solution: Courts Should Not Hold Affirmative Defenses to
the Plausibility Standard.”137 Further, the court cites Moore’s
Federal Practice and Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &
Procedure, the premier treatises on Federal Civil Procedure.138
The Second Circuit acknowledges that Moore advises against
applying a plausibility pleading standard to affirmative
defenses.139 It also states, however, that Wright & Miller take
no position on the issue.140 This is not correct. Rather, Wright
& Miller, like Moore, clearly instruct that plausibility pleading
should not apply to affirmative defenses.141
133. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97 n.8.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 97 (quoting Nathan Psyno, Note, Should Twombly and Iqbal
Apply to Affirmative Defenses?, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1670 (2011)).
136. See generally Psyno, supra note 135.
137. Id. at 1669–71.
138. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97–98.
139. Id. at 98.
140. Id.
141. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1381 (“The better view is that
the plausibility standard only applies to the pleading of affirmative claims for
relief.”); 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 111, at ¶ 8.08[1] (“[A]ffirmative defense
pleading should not be subject to the same ‘plausibility’ standard applicable in
pleading a claim for relief.”); see also United States ex rel. Patzer v. Sikorsky
Aircraft Corp., 382 F. Supp. 3d 860, 864 n.1 (E.D. Wis. 2019) (“The two highly
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In this additional way, the Second Circuit’s conclusion to
extend plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses is
challenging to understand.
Support among courts,
commentators, and treatises is strongly against extension,
including among the authority the court chooses to reference.
3. Litigation Stage Timeliness
The Second Circuit mentions several times that the notion
of timeliness is relevant to its decision.142 And the court suggests
throughout its opinion that there was something untimely about
the defendant’s response.143 The affirmative defenses at issue in
the instant matter, however, were offered by the defendant in a
timely-filed answer.144 Stated simply, timeliness was not an
issue in the appeal.145
Rather, the Second Circuit repeatedly indicates that special
negative consideration should be accorded to affirmative
defenses pled in “a late stage of litigation.”146 Reading the
decision overall, it seems that this “litigation stage timeliness”—
the raw timeframe in which various litigation activities occur—
is of great concern. Indeed, the court several times elides the
important distinction between timeliness under the Federal
Rules and this litigation stage timeliness.147 This confusion of
the issues does not benefit the opinion’s intelligibility.
Litigation stage timeliness is a somewhat surprising place
respected treatises on federal practice [Wright & Miller and Moore’s] both
recommend against applying the plausibility standard to affirmative
defenses.”).
142. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 95, 96, 99.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 94–95.
145. It is appropriate to point out that there is no “timeliness” of any sort
in Rule 8, and while there is an element of timeliness in Rule 12(f), it does not
implicate the affirmative defenses struck in the instant matter. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 8, 12(f).
146. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 99.
147. E.g., id. at 95 (“Uncertainty has sometimes resulted from the fact
that district courts . . . have not always distinguished between affirmative
defenses in a timely filed answer and those later filed, either with or without
court permission to amend an answer, especially those filed in late stages of
litigation.”); Id. at 99 (“[Defendant] needed to support these defenses with some
factual allegations to make them plausible. Moreover, both affirmative
defenses were presented at a late stage of the litigation. Although the defenses
were presented soon after [plaintiff] filed its second amended complaint . . .”).
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for the Second Circuit to delve. First, and most obviously,
because it does not address the issue that the court has set out
to address.148 Second, because the notion is quite vague.149
Third, because litigation routinely take years without specific
prejudices to any party. Fourth, because the lion’s share of
litigation stage timeliness is controlled not by the parties but
instead by the court—its decisions, its local rules, and the
realities of its docket and schedule. Fifth, because this focus
incentivizes plaintiffs to engage in dilatory practices in order to
deny defendants the ability to plead defenses. Sixth, because
the Federal Rules offer many tools for courts to manage
litigation stage timeliness and provide plainly when a party may
offer affirmative defenses or amend pleadings.150
Further, the Second Circuit elides that the affirmative
defenses at issue were part of a request by the defendant to
amend its answer before the second amended complaint was
filed.151 Indeed, the relationship of these affirmative defenses to
the second amended complaint was compelled by the trial court’s
“unusual” solution to the “complicated” procedural posture of the
matter.152 The Second Circuit’s ruling that the defendant’s
affirmative defenses were somehow untimely—and would
prejudice the plaintiff—punishes the defendant for both
adhering to the Federal Rules and following the trial court’s
instructions.153

148. See id.
149. See id. at 94, 100. The Second Circuit has a problem with the
defendant’s motion to amend nine months after its original answer, but does
not articulate just what stage to which the litigation had progressed that would
be damaged by the inclusion of two additional affirmative defenses.
150. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b)(1).
151. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 94.
152. See id.
153. It is somewhat beyond the purview of this Article, but GEOMC has
also likely denied defendants the ability to respond freely to amended
complaints, even with a court’s permission. The permissible scope of a
defendant’s response under Rule 15(a) to an amended complaint is a subject
more commonly addressed in the context of counterclaims. See, e.g., Uniroyal
Chem. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc., No. 3:02CV02253(AHN), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4545, at *3–8 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2005) (noting that, while no court
of appeals has addressed the issue, the lower courts tend to fall into three
camps: (1) permissively allowing defendants to file answers regardless of scope,
(2) narrowly limiting defendant’s responses to amended complaints to the
newly-amended material, and (3) a “moderate approach” where the scale of
plaintiff’s changes inform the scale permitted to defendants; and concluding
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Moreover, the Second Circuit elects not to acknowledge that
the plaintiff’s new allegations in the second amended complaint
arise at an identically “late stage[] of the litigation” as the
defendants’ affirmative defenses.154 In all likelihood, the
plaintiff’s new allegations expand the scope of the litigation and
are significantly more prejudicial than a few affirmative
defenses.
Finally, the Second Circuit’s consideration of litigation
stage timeliness works to undermine a common justification for
extending the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative
defenses: that defendants would later be freely able to amend
their pleadings to add affirmative defenses.155 Instead, plaintiffs
now have another argument to attempt to prevent just that.
4. Wherefore McCaskey
The Second Circuit’s lengthy discussion of the McCaskey
standard and its application also raises questions. To begin, the
court does not seem to approve of McCaskey.156 At a point, the
court expressly repudiates the McCaskey standard as written.157
Despite this, the court systematically applies McCaskey and,
indeed, requires this approach to be used within the Second
Circuit.158
What might be even more confusing is that the Second
Circuit engages in this exercise at all. The lower court did not
cite to or rely on the McCaskey standard; the Second Circuit’s
examination of the McCaskey standard is sua sponte.159 Indeed,
that “[s]imply put, principles of fairness compel the court to conclude that if a
plaintiff is permitted to expand the scope of the case by amending her
complaint to add new theories of recovery, a defendant should be permitted to
do the same [thing].”). And, indeed, the issue is addressed more directly in the
remainder of the GEOMC decision, which considers the defendant’s attempt to
amend to add counterclaims. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 99. A defendant’s
affirmative defenses appear now to be circumscribed by the specific content of
the amended complaint. See id.
154. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 95, 99–101.
155. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
156. See GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 96–99 (citing SEC v. McCaskey, 56 F. Supp.
2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
157. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 96–97.
158. Id. at 99–102.
159. See id. at 97–99. McCaskey appears once in the prior proceedings, in
a reference to another case that cites McCaskey. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare
Therapeutics Inc., No. 3:14-cv-01222 (VAB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144735, at
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the court acknowledges that the court below applied a standard
derived via a different line of cases.160 Moreover, in exploring
McCaskey, the court delineates a line of cases beginning with
McCaskey that has, over many years, altered and refined the
McCaskey standard into its current form.161
This all raises two additional curiosities. First, given that
McCaskey is not used in the case below, is not a universally
applied standard in the Second Circuit, and is significantly
different in its current form from when it was decided, it is
unclear why the Second Circuit selects this opportunity to
prevent “district courts continu[ing] to repeat the three-factor
formulation as worded in McCaskey.”162 There does not appear
to be much risk of that. Second, given the disfavor in which the
Second Circuit appears to hold McCaskey’s formulation, the
alternative case law in the Second Circuit, and the
acknowledged distance between the modern formulation of the
McCaskey standard and the one actually presented in McCaskey,
it is unclear just why the court chooses to apply the McCaskey
standard as it was originally written.163
The Second Circuit makes no changes at all to the second or
third original McCaskey factors.164 In this way, the court
abrogates any judicial refinements to those portions in
intervening years.
However, the real action is in the Second Circuit’s treatment
of the first original McCaskey factor. The court describes its
inquiry as “[w]hether the first of the McCaskey factors should be

*9 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2016) (citing Coach, Inc. v. Kmart Corps., 756 F. Supp.
2d 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). The Second Circuit says that the court below
cited Coach (quoting McCaskey) for the proposition that “[i]f a court determines
that a defense is legally insufficient, the court must next determine whether
inclusion of the defense would prejudice the plaintiff.” GEOMC, 918 F.3d at
97. This is not correct. The court below cited Coach (and quoted McCaskey)
for the proposition that “the Court should construe ‘the pleadings liberally to
give the defendants a full opportunity to support its claims at trial, after full
discovery has been made.’” GEOMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144735, at *12–
13. This is the only proposition for which Coach cites McCaskey and the only
proposition for which McCaskey appears below.
160. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97–99.
161. Id.; see SEC v. McCaskey, 56 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
162. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97.
163. See id. at 96–97.
164. Id. at 98.
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reworded in light of Twombly.”165 Yet this is a question to which
it never returns.
The court does not articulate a new
formulation, nor does it reject the existing language.166
So, the court somehow incorporates Twombly into the first
factor of McCaskey’s existing three-part test.167 However, it is
not clear exactly how. There are many options. The first
McCaskey factor could be replaced with some language of
Twombly. Or perhaps the McCaskey formulation still exists and
Twombly provides a standard to satisfy it.168 Or perhaps the
whole McCaskey standard has been functionally superseded. If
McCaskey remains, what is the relationship between the factors
now? Is one preeminent? Need all be satisfied? Are they
disjunctive?
5. Below Plausibility; Above Fair Notice
The Second Circuit expressly embraces applying Twombly
to affirmative defenses.169 But the court strongly emphasizes
the “context” provisions of Iqbal, which seem intended to temper
a bright-line application of any rule.170 It also states that the
evaluation of affirmative defenses must be less rigorous than
that of claims.171 The Second Circuit instructs that courts
examining affirmative defenses should be guided in their
inquiry by the brief timeframe accorded to defendants to gather
facts and by the specific affirmative defenses pled, of which there
are dozens of options.172 These imperatives will necessarily
165. Id. at 97.
166. See supra notes 103, 108 and accompanying text.
167. See GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97 & n.8.
168. This approach would be akin to those courts that have suggested that
Twombly merely describes the quantum of information necessary to provide
fair use under pre-existing standards. E.g., Dodson v. Munirs Co., No. S-130399 LKK/DAD, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85768, at *16–17 (E.D. Cal. June 18,
2013).
169. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97–98.
170. Id. at 98 n.9. This is a bit of a sleight of hand, where Iqbal extended
a rule developed in the antitrust context to all civil actions and greatly
expanded the scope of plausibility pleading. See supra notes 27–28 and
accompanying text.
171. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98.
172. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
The
acknowledgement and concern for the unfairness visited upon defendants by
the extension of plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses is a primary
reason cited by courts choosing not to extend. See supra notes 56–57 and
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require district courts, in every instance, to engage in a less
rigorous inquiry than they perform for claims because, in every
instance, defendants have far less time than plaintiffs to collect
factual material for their pleading.173 At the same time, every
affirmative defense must undergo a unique inquiry because the
factual support to prove each affirmative defense is different,
and, therefore, a different showing is required to render each one
“plausible,” given context.174
All told, the Second Circuit has mandated that the district
courts develop as many gradations of scrutiny as there are
affirmative defenses. And on its instruction of a less rigorous
inquiry, these dozens (hundreds?) of independent review
standards must exist somewhere below plausibility yet above
fair notice. This is before considering whether the same
affirmative defense might be accorded a different review given
litigation stage timeliness concerns.175 It seems likely that the
new standard will introduce significant uncertainty to
pleadings.176
The examples that the Second Circuit provides do not add
significant clarity. The court offers a pair of affirmative defenses
that possess, in its estimation, different expected availability of
factual material (and, presumably, one should be struck and one
should not).177 Further, the court states simply that “the facts
needed to plead a statute-of-limitations defense will usually be
readily available.”178 However, it is not entirely clear why the
facts to support a statute of limitations affirmative defense will
usually be readily available, and noting the word “usually,” the
court offers no guidance as to how a court should determine
whether the instance in front of it is, or is not, one where the
accompanying text. By attempting to accommodate this unfairness in its new
rule, the Second Circuit tacitly acknowledges that it is a powerful argument
against extension.
173. See GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98.
174. Id.
175. See supra notes 141–54 and accompanying text.
176. It is beyond the scope of this Article, but a question also arises about
the Second Circuit’s new standard and pled claims. The “context” requirement
derived from Iqbal seems like it would apply to pled claims too, but the
Supreme Court does not suggest in Twombly or Iqbal that different levels of
scrutiny will apply at different times or to different claims; plausible is
plausible.
177. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98.
178. Id.
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facts relevant to the defense are readily available to the
defendant. On the other hand, the court states that “the facts
needed to plead an ultra vires defense . . . may not be readily
available.”179 Again, the circumstances in which the facts may
or “may not be” readily available are not suggested by the Second
Circuit.180 This is a scenario that seems ripe for abuse by clever
plaintiffs.181
Without more specific guidance, the Second Circuit’s
examples suggest the unusual result that affirmative defenses
with “readily apparent” facts should be struck for implausibility,
while affirmative defenses more fairly characterized as fishing
expeditions will be allowed to proceed. And requiring a
defendant to plead facts that are “readily apparent” at the
penalty of losing its, say, statute of limitations defense is
reminiscent of the strict pleading standards that the Federal
Rules were adopted specifically to abolish.182
C. In Conclusion Regarding GEOMC
Given these many and sundry peculiarities of the GEOMC
decision, it is not clear that the Second Circuit succeeded in its
179. Id.
180. This specific selection of ultra vires as an example of an affirmative
defense where the factual complexity is such that it is inoculated against
motions to strike is also a bit puzzling. In New York, at least, the “Defense of
ultra vires” is a legislative provision codifying that there is no cause of action
sounding in ultra vires, absent a few enumerated exceptions. N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW § 203 (McKinney 2019). Either the plaintiff has offered a statutorily
infirm claim, or it has not; this should be ascertainable from the content of the
complaint.
181. See Burget v. Capital W. Sec. Inc., No. CIV-09-1015-M, 2009 WL
4807619, at *3–4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2009) (striking a statute of limitations
affirmative defense with prejudice over defendant’s argument that plaintiff
had not pled sufficient information to determine whether they were timebarred); cf. Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel. Concession Plan v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc.,
No. 05-CV-0233-WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008)
(declining to strike an affirmative defense because plaintiffs had not alleged
relevant facts).
182. See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D 456, 458 (1943)
(“Strict pleading produces a reaction, because people will not tolerate the
denial of justice for formalities only. That, as we should do well to recall, was
the history of common-law pleading, as well as of some of the later
misapplications of code pleading.”); see also LINDA J. SILBERMAN ET AL., CIVIL
PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 540 (3d ed. 2009) (“The modern pleader is
at much lesser risk of losing his rights through a technical pleading mistake.”);
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1) (“No technical form is required.”).
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goal to “clarify the standards for pleading affirmative
defenses.”183 The lower courts in the Second Circuit, however,
are constrained to attempt to apply the new mechanism,
regardless of the challenges presented by the ruling.
The district courts have exhibited difficulty interpreting the
Second Circuit’s directives and applying them in a cohesive
manner. Some have offered distinct and not necessarily
compatible formulations of the new rule.184 Others have taken

183. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 94 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[T]o clarify the standards for
pleading affirmative defenses and granting a motion to strike them.”).
184. See, e.g., Jablonski v. Special Couns., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-05243 (ALC),
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53531, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2020) (“[I]n
determining whether to apply plausibility standard or a relaxed version . . .”);
State St. Glob. Advisors Tr. Co. v. Visbal, 431 F. Supp. 3d 322, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (“The Second Circuit has recently clarified that the plausibility standard
of Twombly applies to determining the sufficiency of all pleadings, including
‘the pleading of an affirmative defense.’ Hence, a party asserting affirmative
defenses must ‘support these defenses with some factual allegations to make
them plausible.’”); Haber v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., No. 3:19-cv-276 (VLB),
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222847, at *2–3 (D. Conn. Dec. 31, 2019) (“An
affirmative defense may be stricken if (a) it does not meet ‘the plausibility
standard of Twombly’; (b) it is a legally insufficient basis for precluding a
plaintiff from prevailing on its claims; or (c) it prejudices the defendant and it
is presented beyond the normal time limits of the Rules. When considering a
motion to strike affirmative defenses, the Court should construe the pleadings
liberally to give the defendant a full opportunity to support its claims at trial,
after full discovery has been made.”); Car-Freshner Corp. v. Just Funky LLC,
No. 5:19-CV-0289 (GTS/ATB), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203958, at *2–4
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2019) (“In its clarification of the affirmative-defense
standard, the Second Circuit has focused on the three-factor test used by the
Southern District of New York to assess affirmative defenses in [McCaskey].
The McCaskey three-factor test requires a plaintiff to show as follows: ‘(1) there
is no question of fact which might allow the defense to succeed; (2) there is no
question of law which might allow the defense to succeed; and (3) the plaintiff
would be prejudiced by inclusion of the defense. . . . [T]he pleading party must
produce allegations of fact that provide a sufficient basis for the court to draw
a reasonable inference in favor of the party.”); New London Assocs., LLC, v.
Kinetic Soc. LLC, No. 18cv7963 (DLC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113021, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2019) (“[Plaintiff] cannot reasonably argue that it lacks a
sufficient factual basis to understand the nature of [Defendant’s] proposed
affirmative defenses.”). Compare Car-Freshner Corp., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
203958, at *7 (while acknowledging a lesser burden on plaintiffs in this
instance, rejecting affirmative defenses pled “Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by
doctrine of equitable estoppel” and “Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine
of unclean hands generally”); with Emerson Elec. Co. v. Holmes, No. 16-cv1390 (PKC)(SIL), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100957, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. June 14,
2019) (sustaining defenses pled “The Complaint and its claims are barred by
the doctrine[] of . . . estoppel” and “Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine
of unclean hands”).
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the Second Circuit’s impalpable “context” to strange places.185
Moreover, the judicial effort required to render these decisions
appears to be substantial.186
Despite all this, there is a significant weight of authority,
both mandatory and persuasive, behind a circuit court decision.
Courts in the minority that still favor extending plausibility
pleading to affirmative defenses now have a large hook upon
which to hang their hats.187
D. How the Wind Blows in Other Circuits
A number of circuit courts have made post-Twombly rulings
that suggest that they will not rule in favor of extension when
they choose to address it directly. Either obliquely or directly,
these courts have ruled that affirmative defenses are not subject
to a heightened pleading standard.
For example, the Fifth Circuit continues to apply the fair
notice standard.188 Likewise, but more express, the Ninth
Circuit has ruled that “the ‘fair notice’ required by the pleading
standards only require[s] describing [the affirmative] defense in
‘general terms.’”189 At least one district court in the Ninth
185. See, e.g., Signify N. Am. Corp. v. Reggiani Lighting USA, Inc., No. 18
Civ. 11098 (ER), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49792, at *28–29 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23,
2020) (applying the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses but
declining to engage in the Second Circuit’s less rigorous inquiry because
defendant pled a counterclaim); Emerson Elec. Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100957, at *16 (allowing defenses to stand that it describes as “conclusory”).
186. See, e.g., Jablonski, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53531.
187. See, e.g., Red Label Music Publ’g, Inc. v. Chila Prods., 388 F. Supp.
3d 975, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“The Second Circuit’s approach is persuasive, and
the Court follows its lead.”). But see Doe v. Bojangles’ Rests., Inc., No. 4:19CV-26-TAV-SKL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88348, at *8–9 (E.D. Tenn. May 9,
2019) (“[T]he recent out-of-circuit authority cited by Plaintiff, [GEOMC],
although also well-reasoned, does not persuade me this Court would now apply
the Twombly/Ashcroft plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.”).
188. See, e.g., LSREF2 Baron, L.L.C. v. Tauch, 751 F.3d 394 (5th Cir.
2014); Garrison Realty, L.P. v. Fouse Architecture & Interiors, P.C., 546 Fed.
App’x 458 (5th Cir. 2013); McNeely v. Trans Union LLC, No. H-18-849, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12950 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2019).
189. Kohler v. Flava Enters., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting
5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1274) (“As numerous federal courts
have held, an affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be
held to be sufficient, and therefore invulnerable to a motion to strike, as long
as it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense.”); Sundby v.
Marquee Funding Grp., No. 19-cv-0390-GPC-AHG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
198927, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2019); see also Simmons v. Navajo Cnty.,
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Circuit has opined that the Ninth Circuit had thus definitively
resolved the question of the applicability of plausibility pleading
to affirmative defenses within the Ninth Circuit, going so far as
to abandon a previous pro-extension position.190 And perhaps
more express still, the Sixth Circuit ruled that “[t]he Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a heightened pleading
standard for [the affirmative] defense.”191 The Sixth Circuit
expressly maintained Conley’s fair notice standard with direct
reference to the language of Rule 8.192 Some district courts in
the Sixth Circuit have felt obliged to adhere to the Sixth Circuit’s
interpretation of the Federal Rules to rule that the plausibility
pleading standard does not extend to affirmative defenses.193
Holdings like these suggest that the Second Circuit’s
position will become increasingly isolated as more circuit courts
rule on the issue.194 In this way, it is quite likely that declining
609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The key to determining the sufficiency of
pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives [a] plaintiff fair notice of
the defense.”); Walker v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00556-RCJ-VPC,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84510, at *4–5 (D. Nev. June 29, 2016).
190. Castellano v. Access Premier Realty7, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00407-MCEMJS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158078, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015)
(“District Courts in this circuit were previously split on whether the
heightened pleading standard that the United States Supreme Court
announced in Twombly and Iqbal applied to affirmative defenses. . . . The
Ninth Circuit, however, has resolved the split in the district courts. . . .
Accordingly, this Court now applies the ‘fair notice’ standard, and not the
heightened pleading standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal, when
evaluating motions to strike affirmative defenses.”).
191. Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2009).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Meyers v. Vill. of Oxford, No. 17-cv-10623, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24637, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2019) (“In sum, controlling Sixth
Circuit law and the language of the applicable rules weigh against application
of Twombly and Iqbal’s heightened pleading standard to defendant’s
affirmative defenses here.”); Exclusively Cats Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. Pharm.
Credit Corp., No. 13-cv-14376, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132440, at *2–3 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 22, 2014) (same); Paducah River Painting, Inc. v. McNational Inc.,
No. 5:11-CV-00135-R, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131291, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14,
2011) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit rejected the higher pleading standard in favor of
the fair notice standard.”).
194. See United States ex rel. Patzer v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 382 F.
Supp. 3d 860, 864 (E.D. Wis. 2019) (quoting In re Frescati Shipping Co., 886
F.3d 291, 313 (3d Cir. 2018)) (“In general, an affirmative defense need not be
articulated with any rigorous degree of specificity, and is sufficiently raised for
purposes of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8] by its bare assertion.”); Bigfoot
on the Strip, LLC v. Winchester, No. 18-3155-CV-S-BP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
173447, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2018) (citing Zotos v. Lindbergh Sch. Dist., 121
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to extend the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative
defenses will be the majority position among the circuit courts
as it is among the district courts.
V.

COURTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO DECLINE TO EXTEND
PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING TO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

This Section explains how declining to extend plausibility
pleading to affirmative defenses remains the stronger position,
despite GEOMC. Then, it will offer recommendations on how
courts should respond to the issue when it might present itself
to them.
A. Declining to Extend Plausibility Pleading Is Still the
Superior Position
The language of the Federal Rules disallows the extension
of the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses.195
The language and policy considerations of Twombly and Iqbal
discourage it.196 Unavoidable notions of simple fairness counsel
against it.197 Absent express binding contrary precedent, any
court to address the issue should adhere to the majority position
and decline to extend the plausibility pleading standard to
affirmative defenses.198
No court choosing to extend plausibility pleading to
affirmative defenses has offered a compelling argument to rebuff
the fact that their selected outcome is flatly contrary to the
F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir. 1997)) (ruling that an affirmative defense need not be
pled with any degree of particularity). “[T]he Eighth Circuit, if presented with
the question, might well conclude that Zotos has been abrogated by Iqbal and
Twombly . . . But Zotos is squarely on point, and Iqbal and Twombly are not,
which means Zotos remains the law of this Circuit.” Winchester, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 173447, at *3.
195. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 50, 58–64 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
198. See United States v. Kennebec Scrap Iron, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-191-GZS,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156004, at *4 n.1 (D. Me. Nov. 10, 2016) (“However, the
Court declines to extend the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard to affirmative
defenses given that the First Circuit has yet to address the question.”). But see
Espitia v. Mezzetti Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 18-cv-02480-VKD, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14469, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019) (“[A]bsent clear controlling
authority, [this Court] joins the judges of this district that apply the Twombly
and Iqbal pleading standard to affirmative defenses.”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/4

36

2020

PLEADINGS & AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

229

language of the Federal Rules. The law is clear and inescapable:
Rule 8(c) requires only that a defendant “state” its affirmative
defenses and does not require a defendant to make a
“showing.”199 Indeed, courts choosing to extend plausibility
pleading to affirmative defenses frequently select not to mention
Rule 8(c), even though it controls the question.200 These silences
speak poorly of the decisions in which they occur; Rule 8(c)
mandates a result other than the one these courts reach.
Neither Twombly nor Iqbal changes this reading. If
anything, the specific and exclusive focus in those decisions on
Rule 8(a) counsels against extension.201 Further, only the
Supreme Court is empowered to alter the pleading standard for
affirmative defenses articulated in the Federal Rules, which it
has not done.202 It is outside the authority of any lower court to
alter the scope or meaning of any Rule; there is a non-trivial
argument that every court that selects to extend the plausibility
pleading standard to affirmative defenses violates the Rules
Enabling Act.203
As is widely referenced, defendants have a very limited
window in which to retain counsel and offer a defense (typically
twenty-one days).204 This is in contrast to the years that
plaintiffs have to formulate their complaints. Holding these
parties to an equal standard presents widely divergent
burdens.205
199. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051
(D. Minn. 2010) (“An affirmative defense is not a claim for relief, and neither
Rule 8(a)(2) nor any other rule requires a defendant to plead facts ‘showing’
that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.”).
200. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir.
2019).
201. See cases cited supra note 50 and accompanying text.
202. See sources cited supra note 5 and accompanying text; cf. Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009).
203. See Jennifer M. Auger, A ‘Plausible’ Outcome?: Twombly, Iqbal, and
the Unforeseen Impact on Affirmative Defenses, 75 MD. L. REV. 905, 932 (2016)
(“The decision by district courts to extend the ‘heightened’ plausibility
standard beyond the arena of complaints as established by the Supreme Court
in [Twombly] and [Iqbal] violates the [Rules Enabling] Act.”); Stephen Mayer,
Note, An Implausible Standard for Affirmative Defenses, 112 MICH. L. REV.
275, 298–300 (2013).
204. See cases cited supra note 56 and accompanying text.
205. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051
(D. Minn. 2010).
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Moreover, the Rules also require that a defendant plead any
affirmative defense that it has at pain of waiving that
affirmative defense.206 The courts that choose to extend the
plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses force
defendants to play a critical game of chicken in which they can
only lose.207 These defendants must either select not to plead a
defense or they must hope later to amend their response.208
Those seeking to amend a response will surely be resisted and,
despite the purposefully lenient standard, will sometimes be
rejected.209
Similarly, the burdens imposed upon the courts and adverse
litigants by “unnecessary” pleadings from plaintiffs or
No real
defendants are not alike in scale or scope.210
equivocation is possible. Plaintiffs fill dockets and seek access
to discovery.211 This is plain from the fact that a successful
motion to dismiss the complaint will preclude further discovery
or litigation activities, while a successful motion to strike will

206. Meyers v. Vill. of Oxford, No. 17-cv-10623, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24637, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2019) (“Although there are some exceptions,
it is generally understood that the failure to allege an affirmative defense in
the first responsive pleading may result in a waiver of the defense.”).
207. See Vogel v. Huntington Oaks Del. Partners, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 438,
441 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-737, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *15 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010).
208. McGinity v. USAA Fed. Savs. Bank, No. 5:19-cv-560-BO, slip op. at
3 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2020); Racick v. Domonion L. Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 234
(E.D.N.C. 2010); Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL
2605179, at *6 (W.D. Va. June 24, 2010) (“Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure contemplates that motions to amend pleadings on that basis of
relevant facts learned during discovery, and such motions should be liberally
granted.”).
209. See Henry v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 17cv0688 JM(NLS),
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30779, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018) (“[A] heightened
pleading standard may require the court to address multiple motions to amend
the answer as discovery reveals additional defenses.”); Florilli Transp. v. W.
Express, Inc., No. 14-CV-00988-DW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185459, at *4
(W.D. Mo. Feb. 20, 2015) (“[T]hen, after taking discovery, [defendants will
need] to move the Court for permission to amend their answers to add
affirmative defenses . . . Thus, another round of motion practice would be added
to many cases, increasing the burdens on the federal courts, and adding
expense and delay for the parties.”).
210. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
211. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007); see also
Bayer CropScience A.G. v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 10-1045 RMB/JS, 2011
U.S Dist. LEXIS 149636, at *3 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (noting “the absence of a
concern that the defense is unlocking the doors of discovery”).
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Moreover, defendants cannot force
achieve neither.212
settlements based upon unsupported affirmative defenses.213
Indeed, the desire to curb unwarranted but business-rational
settlements was a prime motivation of the Supreme Court in
Twombly.214 Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning would
counsel for making the pleading standard for claims tougher, but
not the pleading standard for affirmative defenses.
B. What Courts Should Do from Here
The arguments against extending plausibility pleading to
affirmative defenses are overwhelming. Courts at all levels
should continue to embrace and encourage this reality.
First, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would have
an opportunity to rule on the sufficiency of the pleading of an
affirmative defense. Even so, the Supreme Court does consider
issues of federal procedure that exist among the lower courts.215
It might offer language or explanation in its next rulemaking to
clarify that the plausibility pleading standard applies only to
claims.
Circuit courts in jurisdictions other than the Second Circuit
should meet the question head-on and definitively reject the
extension of the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative
defenses.216 District courts in circuits other than the Second
212. See Florida v. DLT 3 Girls, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-3624, 2012 WL 1565533,
at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 2012).
213. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559; see also In re Quaker Oats Labeling
Litig., No. C 10-0502 RS, 2013 WL 12155299, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2013)
(“Permitting a plaintiff to proceed on a conclusory or factually deficient
complaint potentially exposes the defendant to expensive and intrusive
discovery, and to pressure to settle the matter for its ‘nuisance value.’ In most
cases, even the most conclusory affirmative defenses do not impose similar
burdens.”); Leon v. Jacobson Transp. Co., No. 10 C 4939, 2010 WL 4810600, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2010) (“The point [of Twombly and Iqbal] was to reduce
nuisance suits filed solely to obtain a nuisance settlement. The Court, though,
has never once lost sleep worrying about defendants filing nuisance affirmative
defenses.”).
214. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59.
215. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074. The Rules are
periodically updated by the Supreme Court via an elaborate committee review
procedure, pursuant to a statutory requirement that the Judicial Conference
of the United States, the national policy-making body for the federal courts,
must “carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general
rules of practice and procedure . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 331.
216. See supra notes 188–94 and accompanying text.
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Circuit should likewise decline to apply Twombly to affirmative
defenses whenever the issue is offered to them. For the most
part, this is what the district courts currently do, so no great
upheaval is suggested.217
As to the Second Circuit, it should revisit its GEOMC
decision. As discussed above, the ruling is not supportable.218
Short of revisiting GEOMC, the Second Circuit should articulate
the reasoning by which it concluded that the plausibility
pleading standard extends to affirmative defenses.219 As it
stands, the concerns the Second Circuit expressed with “context”
already have a well-tailored solution: notice pleading.220 It
accommodates defendants’ severe disadvantage in timeframe,
and it allows all affirmative defenses to be considered
similarly.221 Perhaps most of all, it allows for district courts to
manage reasonably the matters before them pursuant to the
Federal Rules, while not inviting a glut of unnecessary motion
practice.222
Lower courts in the Second Circuit should apply the
nebulous “context” standard as broadly as possible.223 Perhaps
as an unintended side-effect of the peculiarities of the GEOMC
decision, a district court could quite rationally accept as
adequately pled every affirmative defense offered within the
twenty-one days normally accorded to defendants to respond to
a complaint while still remaining fully compliant with the
GEOMC ruling.224 Indeed, district courts in the Second Circuit
should rule in every instance that the time frames are too brief,
the prejudices to defendants too severe, and the relative burdens
too lopsided to restrict defendants’ opportunity to offer a full and
vigorous defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most courts to consider the issue have come to the correct
217. See sources cited supra note 69 and accompanying text.
218. See GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92, 95 (2d
Cir. 2019).
219. See supra notes 122–27 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
222. See cases cited supra note 64 and accompanying text.
223. See GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98.
224. Id.
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conclusion: procedure, precedent, and policy all strongly disfavor
extending the plausibility pleading standard articulated in
Twombly and refined in Iqbal to affirmative defenses. Nothing
in the last ten years, including the Second Circuit’s GEOMC
decision, has cast doubt on this basic analysis. Courts presented
with the issue should continue to remember the requirement of
Federal Rule 8(e)—that pleadings must be construed so as to do
justice—and decline to extend the plausibility pleading standard
to affirmative defenses.
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